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Abstract
Governmental spending on science is usually justified by claims that the resulting research will
yield benefits for the sponsoring nation. I present policy-analytic and ethnographic research—
based on 30 hour-long interviews—of the Mexican ecological research community to explore the
structural influence of publication incentives on research content and its relevance to national
needs. During a financial crisis in the 1980s, Mexico created a national publication incentive sys-
tem, the Sistema Nacional de Investigadores, to identify and reward scientists producing the most
and the most-cited research as defined by dominant international scientific norms at the time. The
system has increased productivity but in the process has undermined that country’s ability to
benefit from its ecological research by surrendering priority setting to the editorial preferences of
journals that are linguistically and financially unavailable to potential domestic users. The Mexican
experience has implications for institutions worldwide that utilize quantitative productivity
measures in researcher evaluation.
Key words: ecology; impact factor; Mexico; research evaluation; researcher productivity; Sistema Nacional de Investigadores.
1. Introduction
Societal support for science stems from the expectation that science
benefits society financially, by contributing to technological innov-
ations, and by informing decisions (Sarewitz 2004). These expect-
ations were given prominent voice by Vannevar Bush in his
influential 1945 essay Science—The Endless Frontier, which por-
trayed scientific advance as a pre-condition for societal improve-
ment (Bush, 1945; Stokes, 1997). Bush’s argument came in an essay,
solicited by then-US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, proposing that
the USA needed to maintain its scientific capacity upon the end of
the Second World War. Each country—in his estimation—has to do
its own basic scientific research in order to advance its economy;
‘A Nation which depends on others for its new basic scientific
knowledge will be slow in its industrial progress and weak in its
competitive position in world trade, regardless of its mechanical
skill’ (Bush, 1945). This aspect of his thinking resonated widely, as
is reflected in the current trend for international organizations, na-
tions, and research institutions within those nations to use the size
of budgets and counts of publications as metrics of the adequacy of
their scientific enterprises (e.g. Lemarchand, 2010).
Bush took the opportunity to argue not just that the nation would
benefit from substantial government funding, but also to assert that sci-
entific knowledge would yield the greatest societal benefit if ‘scientists
are free to pursue the truth wherever it may lead’ (Bush, 1945). Despite
the countless technological innovations and scientific breakthroughs
that observers today trace to wartime research (e.g. Sarewitz, 2016),
Bush saw government efforts to steer scientists toward knowledge
needs during Second World War as ‘rigid controls’ that minimized the
contributions that science could make.
Michael Polanyi (1962) further articulated the argument for sci-
entific autonomy when he wrote that scientists themselves are best
positioned to make decisions regarding governance of their own ef-
forts. Any centralized attempt to influence the choices of individual
scientists or direct them toward societally important projects would
‘bring the progress of science virtually to a standstill’ (Polanyi,
1962). Collectively, the ‘independent initiatives’ of individual re-
searchers, ‘adjusting themselves at every successive stage to the situ-
ation created by all the others who are acting likewise’, creates—he
argued—a scientific field that is coordinated ‘as if by “an invisible
hand” towards the joint discovery of a hidden system of things’
(Polanyi, 1962). And he wrote that the three criteria scientists use in
evaluating the merit of research are plausibility, scientific merit
(including accuracy, systematic importance, and intrinsic interest),
and originality. To him, these are the only appropriate consider-
ations when evaluating research subjects and methods, and scientists
alone should be responsible for these assessments.
Taken together, Bush’s and Polanyi’s arguments constitute key com-
ponents of what has come to be known as the linear or loading-dock
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model of the science-policy interface (Stokes, 1997; Cash et al., 2006;
Godin, 2006). The basic idea of the linear model is that self-governing
scientists, pursuing their own interests and steered by their shared com-
munity, generate a pool of robust and disinterested basic knowledge.
Other actors then draw from that pool of knowledge for subsequent
use in technological development or decision-making. By the logic of
this model, any increase in financial resources available to basic science
yields a larger pool of knowledge and therefore more eventual societal
benefit. Successful science policy under this model is thus assumed to be
anything that increases publication counts (the size of the pool) or cit-
ations (a severely limited but measureable metric of knowledge use; see
Moustafa (2016)). The logic of the linear model has in recent decades
come to be taken for granted within many scientific and policy com-
munities (Sarewitz et al., 2004; Pielke, 2007).
The linear model is appealing to scientists because it justifies gen-
erous funding with minimal external oversight. And it is a tempting
myth for actors both internal and external to science in that it ap-
pears to maintain a tidy distinction between scientific activity and
eventual use of knowledge, seeming to buffer scientific processes
from the realm of values and politics (Douglas, 2009). This asserted
separation of values entailed in knowledge production from social
and political ones is part of the reason why actors in modern liberal
democracies frequently invoke science in advocating their preferred
policies (Ezrahi, 1990; Barke, 2003; Douglas, 2009).
Despite its intuitive appeal to scientists and non-scientists alike,
however, the linear model has been dismissed as empirically
uninformed wishful thinking for decades by scholars who study
knowledge creation and uptake. Producing more science does not
inherently yield better outcomes. Just as science can contribute
meaningful societal benefit, it can also amplify economic inequal-
ities (Sarewitz et al., 2004; Woodhouse and Sarewitz, 2007), cause
or contribute to environmental challenges (Woodhouse, 2006),
and exacerbate policy controversies rather than dispel them
(Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; Sarewitz, 2004).
One substantial shortcoming with the linear model to which
many scientists can relate is that it is far from assured that a know-
ledge user will make use of relevant research when it does exist. For
a user to make use of knowledge requires that s/he find the relevant
scientific information from the millions of peer-reviewed and pub-
lished articles and books, recognize its utility to their current situ-
ation, deem it to be credible, salient, and legitimate, and know how
to make use of it. An emerging literature suggests that for science to
be most effective at contributing solutions to society’s problems, sci-
entists must interact with potential knowledge users in an ongoing
and iterative fashion, starting with the preliminary task of defining
research questions and selecting methods for analysis, continuing
throughout the research process, and including communication and
possible utilization of the results (Cash et al., 2003; Cash et al.,
2006; Roux et al., 2006; Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007; SPARC, 2010;
Cockburn et al., 2016; Sarewitz, 2016).
Vannever Bush and many since, have advocated for granting scien-
tists substantial autonomy on the premise that we cannot know from
the outset what outcomes—though assumed to be beneficial—will
eventually result from research. Although history bears out his asser-
tion that societal benefit can result from serendipity, it is both a logical
fallacy and historically uninformed to assume therefore that serendipit-
ous outcomes cannot also derive from research priorities accountable
to broader democratic processes (Sarewitz, 1996; Stokes, 1997;
Sarewitz, 2016).
An understanding that societal benefit does not automatically
flow from scientific work suggests that informed science policy
requires reflective awareness of the social and cultural factors at
work within science that help to shape and define scientific research
portfolios and the relationships between producers and users of
knowledge. Publication norms and policies constitute one example:
Vessuri et al. (2014) argue that the desire to publish in a ‘core set’ of
international journals, defined predominantly by the impact factors
(IFs) of those journals, so dominates the cultures of science in Latin
America that it may affect the form and content of the research.
Science policies in the region must be informed by the dynamics of
the publication industry, including the activities of scientists in light
of publishers’ and journals’ editorial activities:
. . . who controls [the journals]? To what end? Journals play a
leading role in creating symbolic value, but how does it relate to
the revenue-making motive of most publishers? Also, what scien-
tific questions are being slighted or even ignored with the present
system of journal competition? Is it possible that, as result of this
regime, scientists from the ‘periphery’ actually contribute more
to problems affecting mostly rich countries (a kind of foreign aid
in reverse) rather than their own? (Vessuri et al., 2014)
Mexico constitutes an ideal case study to evaluate these hypotheses
because national policies there directly incentivize scientists to
pursue publication in these ‘core’ international journals. I use
policy-analytic and ethnographic methods to document Mexico’s
researcher evaluation schemes as science policies—built around the
norms of scientific self-governance—and gauge their impacts on eco-
logical research portfolios and practices in that country. For science
to contribute meaningfully to society requires that the policies and
institutions governing science be designed to encourage or at least be
compatible with that outcome. Current researcher evaluation
schemes in Mexico, though well-intentioned and built upon the
dominant ideas of what constitutes ‘good’ science, undermine the
ability of ecologists in that country to contribute toward the know-
ledge needs of their country.
Mexico’s researcher evaluation scheme, known as the Sistema
Nacional de Investigadores (SNI; ‘National System of Investigators’),
offers substantial financial rewards to scientists with the highest
productivity levels. In practice, for most ecologists, productivity is
equated with the number of articles published in Web of Science
(WoS)-listed journals—with emphasis on those with higher IFs—and
citations from those same journals. Most universities and research
institutes have additional reward systems that mirror (to differing
degrees) the national SNI system, as do many states in Mexico.
The net result is that it is possible to double or triple your salary
as an ecologist if you publish sufficient articles in journals
with high IFs and accumulate adequate citations in those same
journals.
I first introduce the historical motivations behind the creation of
the SNI. Second, I describe the suite of journal and article databases
that SNI relies upon for evaluation and introduce several of the
well-trodden mathematical critiques of those products and their ap-
plication in evaluations of individual researchers. Third, I present an
analysis of how research evaluation systems such as the SNI impact
the content and process of ecological work. The results derive from
analysis of written policies as well as of 30 approximately hour-long
semi-structured interviews that I conducted with Mexican ecolo-
gists, research managers, and government ministry users of scientific
knowledge from 2013–6. In the tradition of qualitative social sci-
ence, I triangulate between different sources and formats of data,
including interview transcripts, policy documents, and published
academic research, to explore the impacts of publication incentive
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schemes on the process, content, and usability of Mexican ecological
research (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Bernard, 2006). The narra-
tives and specific examples differ from scientist to scientist and insti-
tution to institution, but the analysis focuses on themes and
experiences shared broadly by the scientists with whom I spoke.
This work is part of an overall project examining research incen-
tives as science policies in five countries: The USA, Canada, Mexico,
Brazil, and Peru. The project is intended to shine a critical lens
evenly upon all of these national science systems. In this article, I
highlight both the intended and unintended impacts of research poli-
cies in Mexico in the spirit of helping to inform subsequent policy
dialogues. The dynamics I describe are not exclusive to the Mexican
scientific system; in fact, related problems permeate much of modern
science regardless of national setting. Mexico is not the only country
to use simplistic proxy measures of researcher contributions but it
provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate the effects of that
form of researcher evaluation because its policies are well-
articulated and apply nation-wide.
2. Background
2.1 Historical genesis of Mexico’s SNI
In the decades leading up to the 1980s, oil had become a significant
source of government revenue in Mexico; when the price of oil
plunged in 1981 and 1982, the national economy took a big hit.
Mexico at the time was the largest debtor nation in the world, and
without the oil revenue on which it depended, it could no longer
meet its debt obligations to international commercial banks
(Hellman, 1997). The World Bank and International Monetary
Fund intervened, but demanded substantial structural adjustment of
the Mexican economy. By 1988 interest payments on international
loans came to constitute 57 per cent of total government expend-
itures, and its only option was to devalue its currency. Annual infla-
tion during this time climbed as high as 140 per cent (Bello, 2008).
Suddenly, academic salaries that were once sufficient for a comfort-
able lifestyle became almost worthless. Researchers took one of two
responses: some fled to countries that paid higher salaries, and
others treated their secure lifetime positions as sinecures and took
on second or third jobs to make ends meet. Both responses had the
effect of undermining scientific work in the country, and together
they represented a crisis for Mexican science.
In 1983, as this crisis began to unfold, the Academia de la
Investigación Cientı́fica (the National Academy of Science) worked
with the Minister of Education to convince the President that
Mexico needed a policy capable of stemming the brain drain (Heras,
2005). The proposed solution was to identify the most productive
scientists and reward them with salary bonuses. This was the genesis
of the Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (National System of
Investigators), known to Mexican scientists by its acronym SNI.
Under SNI, scientists were asked to report their productivity, and
those scientists who were producing the most were awarded add-
itional pay; those who were not producing much were left with their
base salaries which were greatly devalued by inflation. The dual in-
tent was to encourage researcher productivity and prevent a brain
drain from the country; in both regards, the system worked and
many— but not all— of the early proponents of the system still see
it as a dramatic success.
This is a point worth emphasizing: Mexican science was at risk
of severe damage, and if we accept science to be a worthwhile
activity, we must recognize that the SNI played a crucial role in
maintaining that activity. Indeed, by the problematically simplistic
measure of publication counts in ‘recognized’ journals—the metric
by which much of the global scientific community judges itself—the
country did quite well. Individual researcher productivity increased
across the board (Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso, 2007), and be-
tween 1973 and 2006 total Mexican scientific productivity was the
second-highest in Latin America, behind only Brazil (Lemarchand,
2010). Mexican science would surely have suffered immeasurably
during to the debt crisis in the absence of SNI. But, the system was
not and is not perfect.
2.2 Research evaluation under the SNI
The SNI ranks sufficiently productive Mexican researchers into cate-
gories according to their productivity (Candidate, and Levels I, II,
III, and emeritus) with non-taxable salary bonuses that increase at
each level. Researchers meeting minimum standards are accepted
into the system as candidates, and are re-evaluated periodically at
intervals depending on their ranking. They can climb the rankings
and eventually receive emeritus-status with a permanent lifetime sal-
ary when they have achieved sufficient international recognition.
The system relies heavily on publication databases maintained until
recently by Thompson Reuters, including the WoS, the Science
Citation Index (SCI), and Journal Citation Reports (JCR). In 2016,
corporate investors purchased the Thompson Reuters Intellectual
Property and Science business and incorporated those products
under the name Clarivate Analytics (http://clarivate.com/news/ip-
and-science-launched-as-independent-company/). Reflecting the col-
loquial terminology of Mexican scientists, I refer to these database
products collectively as ISI.
Because SNI rewards the most ‘productive’ scientists (as meas-
ured largely by publication count in and citations from ISI-listed
journals) and because the financial rewards for such productivity
can be significant, individual institutions are under little pressure to
increase base salaries (Casta~nos-Lomnitz, 2003). Doing so would
both impact their budgets and decrease the effectiveness of the prod-
uctivity incentives. And the institutions themselves receive more
funding from the main federal funder of science, the Consejo
Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologı́a (National Council of Science and
Technology, referred to by the acronym CONACyT), when their sci-
entists are more productive. Thus, individual institutions often bring
their own publication incentives into alignment with the national
system.
The goals of the SNI are laudable, and the evaluation is built
upon peer review—scientists evaluating other scientists in the model
of self-governance—which most researchers hold up as a gold stand-
ard of scientific research and the driving force behind scientific self-
governance. Seen through the lens of the linear model, it is a pro-
ductive science policy in that it focuses on increasing the size of the
available pool of knowledge, as evaluated by standards familiar to
the international scientific community. But the merits of the evalu-
ation scheme diminish upon further inspection. When first created,
the system had only three committees to evaluate the portfolios of
all researchers in all of the varied disciplines within the country,
including ethnography, medical science, astrophysics, and every-
thing in between. The committee that evaluated ecologists evaluated
not just the many subfields of ecology, but also the full spectrum of
biological, biomedical, agricultural, and chemical sciences. It was
quite likely under this system that the committee evaluating an
ecologist would include no ecologists.
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The number of committees has since increased to seven
(Auditoria Superior de la Federación, 2009) , but at least three basic
problems remain: (1) Scientists are evaluated by committees that
may not contain a single member with similar expertise; (2)
Publication cultures and rates can vary dramatically between discip-
lines, and indeed between even members of a single discipline that
utilize different methods; and (3) Each of these committees is made
up of fourteen senior researchers who themselves must maintain
productivity while evaluating the productivity of 500 or more scien-
tists over the previous 3 to 5-year period (Ricker et al. 2009). To
complete that number of reviews of scientists in unfamiliar fields,
alongside their other work responsibilities (including maintaining
the productivity that will allow them to stay within the system them-
selves), critics argue that reviewers have no choice but to conduct
cursory analysis of quantifiable indicators of quality: how many
publications does the applicant have, what are the IFs of the jour-
nals in which they appear, and how many citations have those publi-
cations received (Ricker et al. 2009)?
The rules for evaluating researchers vary by committee and can
be altered by the committees themselves. Researchers need SNI-3
status to be eligible for membership on the evaluation committee,
and current committee members elect members as vacancies occur.
This process ensures that those disciplines with faster publication
rates remain strongly represented on committees that most strongly
value publication counts. Agency to bring about change is strongest
for those who have succeeded under the current system; scientists
whose research yields fewer publications in ‘prestigious’ journals—
regardless of their importance for Mexico—have little influence over
future evaluation rules.
Each committee promulgates rules that apply to all scientists in
their domain, without differentiating by disciplines, methods, or in-
stitutions. Grounding researcher evaluation policies in disciplinary
averages of publication and citation counts is problematic even
within a single scientific field, but it is even more-so when expect-
ations rooted in one discipline are applied to others. It is well docu-
mented that disciplines differ in terms of project completion times,
citation practices, and other discipline-specific cultural and logistical
factors (Radicchi et al. 2008); these differences are unrelated to the
utility or importance of the knowledge produced. The committee
that evaluates many ecologists, ‘Area II: Biology and Chemistry’, re-
quires a specific number of publications and citations all researchers
under its jurisdiction must have for admission to each level of SNI
and requires that those publications and citations must be from
within the ISI SCI(CONACyT n.d.). As this article documents, the
policies serve as blunt instruments that incentivize ecological scien-
tists to pursue projects that yield frequent publications to the ex-
pense of research projects and methods that—regardless of their
potential utility to knowledge users in Mexico or to science writ
large—may be slower, result in fewer publications and citations, or
not be as appealing to editorial boards of journals with adequate
IFs, most of which are based abroad.
Defenders of the system maintain that SNI evaluation is more
thorough and nuanced than counts of publications and citations in
high IF or ISI-listed journals (Williams and Aluja, 2010), and indeed
several metrics of researcher impact beyond publication and citation
data (e.g. formation of research groups) are included among Area II
criteria (CONACyT, n.d. section 2.4) and some area committees do
award points for publications appearing in a list of journals main-
tained by CONACyT itself. But the number of publications, the IF
of the journals in which they prefer, and counts of citations accumu-
lated from within ISI-listed journals feature prominently in the
formal evaluation criteria (CONACyT, n.d., section 2.2; Ricker
et al., 2010) and they are central in ecological researchers’ percep-
tions of the SNI. Even if the above defenders of SNI are correct that
the actual evaluations are nuanced and not overly dependent on sim-
plistic quantitative measures of scientific impact, the interviews sug-
gest that ecologists believe the quantitative measures to be central to
SNI evaluations. They are acting accordingly.
2.3 WoS and the SCI
Mexico’s SNI Area II researcher evaluation criteria—and to differ-
ing degrees those in other Area Committees—are built around WoS
products (JCR, SCI, and Journal IF), collectively termed ‘ISI’ by the
community. Publication in ISI-indexed journals yields rewards far
greater than publication in non-indexed journals. Researchers earn
credit also for the number of citations they receive from articles in
indexed journals; those coming from other journals do not count.
The ISI databases, however, are not comprehensive in their cover-
age, nor are they meant to be. The modern SCI is built upon a prod-
uct from the late 1950s, the Genetics Citation Index, that Eugene
Garfield created to curate the English-language literature in that
field. He and others expanded upon that core set of journals by cre-
ating the IF, which identified the journals most frequently cited by
authors in his genetics index. These were included in an expanded
database, the SCI, which has grown from the seed of the original
Genetics Citation Index (Garfield, 2006).
Garfield envisioned his indices as curations of the scientific lit-
erature, highlighting the best journals in covered fields (Garfield,
1990; Garfield, 2006;). There are, however, problems in ISI’s imple-
mentation of these goals. Current inclusion criteria are only vaguely
described publically, but depend heavily on the number of citations
from currently listed journals (Garfield, 1990; Laborde, 2011) des-
pite the lack of any consistent relationship between citation counts
and the actual contribution of the article to science or society
(Bozeman, 2003; Bozeman and Sarewitz, 2011; Moustafa, 2016).
The characteristics of the journals that were included initially—
including language and discipline—thereby became systematic
biases determining the fates of other journals seeking inclusion. The
databases until recently contained very few if any Spanish- or
Portuguese-language journals in any field, so researchers writing in
those languages are rarely cited in listed journals. This constitutes a
self-reinforcing and circular bias: the lack of citations to Latin
American Journals in indexed journals becomes a justification for
not including Latin American journals in future years (see also
Archambault and Larivière , 2009). And, because scientists are re-
warded for publishing in indexed journals, the language bias in the
indices virtually guarantees that Spanish- and Portuguese-language
journals do not receive as many high-quality submissions since
would-be authors first seek publication in ISI-indexed journals
(Laborde, 2009; Fischman et al., 2010; González-Alcaide et al.,
2012; Vessuri et al., 2014).
Pressure from competing indices, which had better coverage of
Latin American Journals, led Thompson Scientific (current owner of
this suite of products) in 2008 to suddenly reverse recent decisions
that had excluded a number of Spanish- and Portuguese-language
journals. These business decisions more than doubled the number of
Latin American journals in ISI products, but brought the total to a
mere 242 (Alperin, 2014). Nothing had changed about the editorial
policies of those journals, nor about the citations those journals
had received; rather, to all appearances, Thompson Reuters made a
business decision based on external competition (Laborde, 2011).
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The inclusion of these journals moderately improved ISI coverage;
for contrast, Latindex, the most comprehensive index of the region’s
journals, lists 5,408 Latin American journals ‘of academic interest’
meeting a set of minimum criteria and known to be actively publish-
ing (Alperin, 2014). And one recent estimate found that 80 per cent
of Mexico’s research output from 2005–11 was in national journals
(López Casta~nares, 2013), most of which have no representation in
WoS. Nevertheless, SNI incentives are built around WoS products.
In 2014, Thompson Reuters made the Scientific Electronic
Library Online, an open-access database of predominantly Latin
American journals, available through its Web interface (Packer,
2014). These actions to include more Latin American journals in its
resources benefit researchers working in those regions, but it also
underscores a key point about ISI’s indices: they are commercial
products designed with a profit motive. The SCI comprises what
amounts to an arbitrary subset of research journals, curated by a
company seeking financial profit. Admission to the ISI SCI is deter-
mined by proprietary criteria that are demonstrably inconsistently
applied. Any alignment between decisions rooted in profit maxi-
mization of corporate owners of the WoS and related products and
the knowledge needs of the countries financing the science that
yields ISI-listed publications is coincidental, not intentional or
inherent.
2.5 The journal IF
IF ¼
#citations rec0d in year x for articles published
in preceeding 2 years
#citable items published during those 2 years ðGarfield; 2006Þ
Because the Journal IF plays a central role directly in researcher
evaluation in Mexico and is also used to select journals for inclusion
in the SCI, the design of the statistic merits evaluation. The IF is a
mechanically objective yet systematically biased measure of the sci-
entific merits of academic journals—the purpose for which it was
created—and is a mathematically inappropriate metric for assessing
the merits of individual articles published in them.
Journals can—and do—manipulate their IFs in several ways
completely unrelated to scientific quality (Archambault and
Larivière, 2009). For example, journals can manipulate the ratio of
citable to non-citable items by including news items such as those
that fill half the pages of Science and Nature. These news pieces are
frequently cited and are thus included in the numerator of the calcu-
lation, but the IF calculation treats them as non-citable and thus
they are not included in the denominator (c.f. Garfield, 2006).
Another way journals can boost their IFs is to publish reviews,
which on average are more heavily cited than original research
(Garfield, 1990; Moustafa, 2015). A third way is to require authors
publishing in that journal to cite articles in that journal; the practice
of asking authors to list additional articles in that journal as recom-
mended further reading is probably less effective, but serves the
same purpose of steering more potential authors to content in a
journal.
Since Thompson Reuters (and presumably the spun-off current
owner, Clarivate Analytics) also tracks ‘auto-citations’, or citations
from a journal to other articles in that journal, journals have had to
develop more elaborate schemes to boost their rankings. Several
Brazilian journals, for example, were recently suspended from the
JCR for manipulating their IFs in a complex citation ring wherein
they conspired to publish reviews that featured intentional citations
to co-conspirator journals (Van Noorden, 2013). That editors
would go through the trouble of intentionally boosting their citation
frequencies, and do so in such a way as to disguise their efforts from
Thompson Reuters, indicates how seriously journals take their IFs.
To the extent that the scientific community agrees that good science
is published in high IF journals, journals that fail to compete on that
metric will cease to attract high-quality submissions.
Other flaws exist as well. Garfield created the Citation Index
and related products for a specific commercial audience: the early
customers of Current Contents, dominated by genetics, molecular
biology and biochemistry (Garfield, 2006; Laborde, 2011). Because
it suited the citation patterns of those fields at that time, Garfield
elected to calculate a 2-year IF, rather than some other time-period.
Disciplines, as argued earlier, vary significantly in terms of how long
after publication appears it takes before citations to that publication
peaks, and the 2-year window is a poor indicator of the total num-
ber of citations that articles in many disciplines receive
(Archambault and Larivière, 2009; Vanclay, 2009).
The IF is an average of citations received by all articles in a given
journal, but its use to evaluate the merits of individual articles in
those journals is mathematically unjustified because the calculation
says nothing about the distributions of citations to individual art-
icles. Testing how well IF predicts citation to a given article in their
field of mathematics, Adler et al. (2009) found that 32 per cent of
randomly selected articles in a journal with a 0.43 IF had more cit-
ations than those in a journal with a 2.63 IF. The latter has an IF
six-times higher than the former, yet articles in the former are cited
more frequently than those in the latter nearly one-third of the time
(see also Laborde, 2011).
These critiques are just a first-level overview of the technical prob-
lems of using WoS as the basis for quantifying individual researcher
productivity. Based upon these and related issues, a number of prom-
inent scientists and organizations have written about the need to
move away from IF as a metric of article and author contributions
(The PLoS Medicine Editors, 2006; Aitkenhead, 2013; Alberts, 2013;
Pulverer, 2013; Sample, 2013; Schekman, 2013). The critiques in this
article, however, stem not just from the technical inadequacy of the
IF, but also from a concern about the steering influences of evaluation
systems based on productivity and citation measures and their impacts
on society’s ability to benefit from science.
Scholars working within the context of Latin America have begun
to document that policies and cultural norms built around journal IFs
are adversely affecting research there. Vessuri et al. argue, for ex-
ample, that science in the region has become a competitive ‘quest for
excellence’, as defined by primary authorship in a ‘core’ set of journals
with high IFs (Vessuri, 2014. The dynamic is detrimental in a number
of ways. Among these authors’ critiques are the ways in which it de-
prives local and regional journals of content, elevates a few scientists
to international prestige while undervaluing the bulk of the scientific
labor force essential to their work, penalizes risky and novel research,
and places evaluation of quality and scientific importance ‘in the
hands of an international oligarchy made up of publishers and large
scientific societies’ (Vessuri, 2014). Prestigious journals’ editorial poli-
cies and decisions thus become an uncoordinated yet powerful force
in shaping global research agendas and practices; researchers seeking
‘prestige’ must respond to priorities as defined by scientists and jour-
nals in the world’s wealthy countries. This manuscript seeks to docu-
ment, specifically, how scientific norms and formal policies built
around publication ‘prestige’ affect the content and usability of ecolo-
gical research in Mexico.
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3. The impact of the SNI on Mexican ecology
‘The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social
decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pres-
sures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social
processes it is intended to monitor’ (Campbell, 1979; Campbell,
2011).
Mexico adopted ISI-based metrics to evaluate scientists’ product-
ivity based on an acceptance of the linear model of the science–society
relationship and its constituent logic that scientific self-governance is
optimal. Articulating his vision of how scientific self-governance
works, Polanyi argued that although an individual’s substantial depth
in one area of science necessarily means more superficial knowledge
of other areas, scientists are able to judge the merits of projects not
only in their fields but also in adjacent areas (Polanyi, 1962). The de-
signers of SNI and contemporary advocates thereof assert that the
Area Committees can adequately evaluate the range of disciplines
they cover via the metrics they select and administer. The IF of a jour-
nal in which an article is published and the quantity of citations from
indexed journals that an article receives is, they argue, the currency of
science: Good science is published in good journals and receives abun-
dant citations. For my purposes, I am not interested whether SNI
evaluation criteria are ‘objectively’ employed, though that is a wide-
spread concern among Mexican scientists. Rather, my concern is the
systematic steering influence built into an evaluation mechanism that
uses publication and citation counts as easily-quantified-but-inappro-
priate proxies for societal contribution.
Many of the scientists with whom I spoke were initially in favor of
the quantitative rationality implied by the SNI evaluation system. I
spoke separately with several scientists who were instrumental in
building the incentive programs at their institutions (systems based in
part upon SNI rank), but who have since become quite skeptical of
SNI because, as one articulated, the incentive systems push scientists
to ‘focus on subjects that are easy to resolve’ rather than those that
are most important. Easy to resolve, for various participants, meant
research: taking place in relatively well-understood ecosystems;
involving questions that were not prone to disruption by weather, cli-
mate, or other unexpected ecological dynamics; not dependent on
long-term continuity of funding; addressable via analysis of existing
data; and on topics that were appropriate for relatively uninitiated
graduate students, who shared co-authorship with and thus benefited
their advisors. Participants reported that salary bonus systems from
SNI and their institutions penalized risky and novel research, projects
that span multiple field seasons, basic biological surveys, and—in
general—anything that was slow or not easily relatable to topics
trendy in internationally recognized journals. Several noted that the
most heavily cited ecological research topics rely on expensive and in-
accessible equipment, and thus the best they could do was collaborate
with colleagues at wealthier institutions on their projects.
In particular, participants saw success under SNI and institution-
level publication norms as incompatible with use-inspired and
participatory research, approaches that they felt to be more morally
appropriate and to yield more robust knowledge. The desire to do
research that is important to the region and to communities is strong
among many of the ecologists with whom I spoke, and indeed sev-
eral prominent ecological research centers in Mexico were founded
with that goal in mind. Some remote communities with whom my
participants worked perceived outsiders as a threat, given colonial
history and the more recent phenomenon of international scientists
and companies taking local biological samples and profiting from
them. Scientists reported that working with and even among these
communities required months of relationship building, time and ef-
fort that is not rewarded under current evaluation schemes.
There was a palpable frustration among many scientists—
including those at institutions that were founded with the stated pur-
pose of working with agriculturalists to advance sustainable develop-
ment—that success by SNI standards has come at the expense of
societal impact. Many of these scientists very much value establishing
trust-based relationships and working collaboratively with knowledge
users in order to address the knowledge needs of their regions. Several
of them chose to work in those institutional settings explicitly because
their personal goals matched the institutions’ stated missions; some in
fact chose to work in Mexico specifically because they believed that
Mexican scientific cultures valued that approach.
One scientist whose work focuses on evolution of agricultural
crops typified this frustration. He conducts his research in collabor-
ation with and in service of communities of small-holder farms grow-
ing native varieties. His work, he says, is typically not publishable in
the highest IF journals because the emphasis there is on research that
leads to commercializable crops because of the larger scientific audi-
ence that research enjoys internationally. Within his personal research
portfolio, he finds himself balancing the work that he values based
upon his commitment to the farming community with that which is
publishable in high-IF journals because the base salaries are insuffi-
cient without the SNI bonuses. The base salary, he said, ‘is basically
calculated so that you need [the SNI bonus]. . . you cannot do it with
only your salary’. Numerous participants said that they consciously
balance the work that they see as important for Mexico and/or their
communities of interest with that which reaps rewards in SNI.
Some research topics that from the outside appear quite similar meet
very different fates under IF-dominated incentive structures. One partici-
pant who studies social–ecological systems said that despite his strong
dislike of the SNI system, he does fine within it because there happens
to be a relevant journal with a sufficiently high IF score. He noted that
‘if [he] was like 15 degrees in a different research direction . . . most of
the other interdisciplinary social sciencey journals don’t have high rat-
ings, therefore [SNI] would become a major problem for [him].’ That
there is a significantly high IF journal in his field is in part the result of
fortuitous coincidence of business decisions by the corporate owners of
ISI products and the citation habits and interests of authors and editors
in other countries. Mexico, by building the IF into researcher evaluation,
relinquishes science policy to outside actors with no connection to
Mexican interests or priorities (see also Vessuri (2014)).
Several researchers noted that even on topics for which there
were appropriate ISI-listed Spanish language and/or regional jour-
nals, those journals tended to be very disciplinary and focused on
basic science. The collaborative and participatory projects that they
felt they were hired to do typically do not get published, they noted,
in standard disciplinary journals any more than they get published
in ISI-recognized international journals.
Numerous scientists stated that they bucked the pressures to pub-
lish in ISI journals, or balanced those efforts with what they saw as
more meaningful work. One explained as follows: ‘. . . we are stub-
born! We are still doing both things’. That flexibility, however, is not
available to everyone. Another scientist, who also saw publication ex-
pectations and high-quality research to be at cross-purposes, found
that her freedom to conduct meaningful and high-quality work de-
pended on her being in comfortable financial position:
I don’t believe in numbers; I believe in quality and it affects my
salary. I don’t have children so I have the luxury to do quality
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research because I have the luxury to not depend on [. . .trails
off]. I don’t have a luxurious life and so money cannot control
my research to the same extent as someone who has a family.
Sentiments such as these might be chalked up to typical complaints
of how hard it is to be a scientist, but even scientists at the upper
echelons of SNI and their home institutions offered similar examples
of balancing SNI-rewarded work with ‘meaningful’ research. One
SNI-3 ecologist with whom I spoke said that he had switched re-
search areas to a field that was in fashion in high-IF journals, not
because he felt it was more valuable to either the advancement of
science or to potential users of the knowledge, but because he had
been stuck at SNI-2 for more than a decade and the financial pres-
sure from SNI and his university was worth making the change.
There was a palpable frustration that evaluation metrics not only
failed to reward, but actively devalued what the participants deemed
to be important and high-quality science.
Individual institutions in Mexico typically have their own publi-
cation incentive systems and could use them to develop their own
priorities and approaches to research. Many, however, do not devi-
ate substantially from SNI definitions of ‘high quality’ research be-
cause doing so would cause them to lose funding for research and
graduate fellowships, which are tied to productivity. And, were an
institution to deviate strongly from SNI in terms of the research it
incentivized, individual scientists within would incur the cost of
foregoing SNI-recognized work to succeed in the institution’s sys-
tem. Individual institutions have incentives to double-down on those
SNI-based productivity policies rather than seeking to align their
pay structures with their institutional missions.
Possibly in part because scientists are titrating their publication
efforts to produce just enough articles in listed journals to make
their needed salary bonuses, a great majority of scientists in the sys-
tem are at the first level. To further boost ‘productivity’, CONACyT
has created additional incentives, such as stipulating that for gradu-
ate programs to achieve top accreditation levels (and receive the
associated resources), 60 per cent of the full-time research professors
in that program must be SNI members and 40 per cent must be in
Levels 2 and 3 (CONACyT, 2015).
Further pushing quantity of scientific production, CONACyT
makes student aid contingent upon universities having students gradu-
ate within 2 years for a master’s degree and 4 years for a doctorate,
and students are required to publish (preferably in a high-impact jour-
nal) to obtain their degrees. This has led some universities to formally
sanction professors whose students do not graduate within that time
frame. These policies, my participants explain, are systematic incen-
tives for them and their students to avoid: field research that requires
multiple field seasons; projects that could be delayed by unexpected
ecological conditions or changes; and work that is not deemed to be
of interest to distant editors of ISI-listed journals.
If there were a wisdom inherent in the invisible hand of science
that transcended the insights and instincts of our participants, it
might not constitute a problem that so many scientists felt pulled
from what they deem to be ‘important’ work for their region and
pushed toward that which yields frequent publication and citations.
The Mexican ecological research portfolio, however, leaves some
problematic gaps that indicate that the invisible hand—though a
powerful steering force—does not guide researchers toward topics
that benefit the sponsoring nation. Substantial scientific work has
long since been conducted in the regions surrounding Mexico City
because of the comparative wealth of that region and the concentra-
tion of universities and research centers there. Other regions of the
country, including the most biodiverse regions of southern Mexico,
historically received very little scientific attention because they are
comparatively remote. Current policies create a disincentive to study
these areas today: ecologists report that there are few scientists
today who are willing to conduct the initial biological surveys
required to establish new research sites because doing so would re-
sult in a 3- to 5-year reduction in ‘productivity’ as measured by SNI.
Thus, even though research in these culturally and biologically di-
verse regions would probably yield high IF publications, the work is
not conducted because of unintended steering influences of the SNI
incentive system.
The geographic bias in research attention—which participants
asserted is exacerbated by publication incentives—is evident in
terms of statistical measures of scientific productivity, including SNI
membership data: in 2009, the Federal District had 1,066 scientists
in the SNI system in Chemistry and Biology (Area II, which includes
ecology) while several southern states, with some of the highest bio-
diversity, had between one and fifty each. All but three of the
Mexican states outside of the Federal District had fewer than ninety
(San Román and Zú~niga-Bello, 2009).
Even governmental knowledge users in Mexico are frustrated by
the impacts that the IF-centric researcher evaluation has had on
Mexican science. Interview participants reported that CONABIO,
Mexico’s biodiversity conservation ministry, is increasingly frus-
trated that the SNI incentivization system dissuades scientists from
conducting biological and species distribution surveys and taxa-
nomic research—especially in relatively under-studied ecosystems
and regions—both because of the slow pace of that work and be-
cause the outputs they need tend to be datasets and reports, rather
than the foreign language peer-reviewed journal articles that policies
encourage researchers to produce. The dynamic is sufficiently strong
that CONABIO has trouble convincing scientists to conduct these
types of studies even when CONABIO is providing the funding for
the work.
There is a similar tension about desired outputs between scien-
tists and their funders related to a funding stream known as fondos
mixtos (mixed funds) that combines federal money with support
from the Mexican states. Researchers receiving this money report
being caught between competing demands from the two funding
sources: the states want decision tools relevant to local knowledge
needs, while CONACyT and scientists’ host institutions want publi-
cations in and citations from international journals. The lack of con-
sensus about what constitutes an important scientific output that
exists between funders and scientists was sufficiently aggravating
that it came up in numerous conversations with both types of actors.
Some calls for proposals specifically state that a scientific publica-
tion will not count as a product of the project; funders want to see
that their money contribute toward application and they do not con-
sider a publication to be a substantial contribution in that direction.
As one participant noted:
Government decision makers and the forestry commission, the
national parks administration, all those people – they’re frus-
trated because the scientists consider the publication as their be-
all and end-all, but for a policy person a publication doesn’t do
anything for them. I have concrete problems in the field that you
need to take care of. . . . The decision makers are frustrated with
the scientists.
For their part, the scientists report that the incompatible expect-
ations of those funding sources and the SNI system not only create
unreasonable demands on their time, but also that the content of the
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work desired by the state funders is typically not of interest to high
IF journals. However important it may be to Mexico, several of our
participants said that they eschew fondos mixtos because the pro-
jects do not offer adequate rewards in the SNI system. It is worth
noting also, however, that many scientists avoided fondos mixtos
also because the specificity of the calls for proposals makes them
look overtly political and possibly written with specific scientists in
mind. The specificity of the calls runs counter to the scientific self-
governance that these scientists are most comfortable with, even as
they recognize the distorting influence of their own governance.
SNI’s impacts on scientific knowledge systems continue beyond
the selection of research topics and field sites. Perhaps the most ob-
vious impact is that SNI incentives push researchers to publish in
English language journals, which presents substantial challenges to
would-be users of that knowledge in Mexico. Some universities pro-
vide translators to ease the challenges for their scientists in publish-
ing in English, but I learned of no analogous effort to translate
research findings of local interest back into Spanish. Even if we were
to accept the linear model’s unfounded presumption that the ad-
vancement of knowledge automatically or inevitably contributes to
societal benefit, we can recognize that language barriers present a
substantial burden complicating the receipt of that benefit. Some
professors report that they find themselves translating key articles
for their students as part of their class preparation simply because
adequately high-quality research is increasingly difficult to find in
Spanish language journals. Defenders of SNI justify the increasing
focus on English language publication by arguing that their goal is
to contribute to a global science, not an isolated regional one, and
that all scientists will learn English as that becomes a necessary skill.
This argument, however, assumes that the only audience for science
is the established scientific community, forgetting the frequently
invoked justification for science funding that it will lead to better
outcomes for the funding nation. To linguistically isolate students—
some of whom are striving to become scientists or ecosystem man-
agers themselves—and decision-makers from the scientific know-
ledge base makes it much more difficult for society to benefit from
science, regardless of the size of the research budget.
Compounding this formidable linguistic barrier is a financial one:
subscriptions to individual high IF journals can cost institutions thou-
sands of dollars or more, and individual articles for those without
journal subscriptions are prohibitively expensive. Many of the scien-
tists I spoke with outside of Mexico City reported difficulties in ac-
cessing the journals in which those researchers are encouraged to
publish. To gain access, numerous ecologists reported that every time
they came across a title of interest, they emailed colleagues at wealth-
ier institutions in the capital or abroad to gain access through those li-
brary subscriptions. Adding insult to injury, many institutions also
cannot afford subscriptions to WoS databases, the very subset of sci-
ence to which they are expected to contribute. It goes without saying
that if university researchers themselves have trouble accessing the
journals in which they publish, similar barriers prevent most potential
local and regional knowledge users from accessing the information
those researchers produce. One scientist noted that the CONACyT
budget, which he felt was already inadequate, is regularly at threat for
additional cuts and attributed that vulnerability to the fact that na-
tional decision-makers saw little benefit from a scientific enterprise
seemed geared toward production of English language journal articles
to which few Mexicans have financial or linguistic access.
In order to publish adequate numbers of articles in ‘top-tier’
journals, many researchers with whom I spoke reported that they
were forced to collaborate with one another and with scientists in
wealthier countries. Doing so gains them access to the equipment, li-
brary resources, and linguistic help that high IF journals require.
While these are seemingly beneficial outcomes, participants reported
that the reality is more complicated. They reported that they end up
trading co-authorship with one another when in fact there was little
true collaboration. And, they reported deliberately committing ‘sa-
lami science’—a term they use to describe submitting ‘the least pub-
lishable unit’, splitting what should be one manuscript into several
that are submitted to different journals. When disconnected from
one another, any potential user of those papers has to find them all,
obtain them from behind paywalls, and assemble the information
into a cohesive whole. Needless to say, this approach to publishing
is problematic if the goal is to produce useable science. Further, sev-
eral of my participants reported surrendering their own research
agendas to those of their better-funded collaborators in wealthier
countries in order to participate in the types of resource-intensive re-
search likely to be accepted into high-IF journals. Given the enor-
mous disparities in distribution of resources available to scientists
across the world, it is hugely problematic to ask scientists in
resource-poor contexts to ‘compete’ in a global scientific project, es-
pecially one that is defined by journal editors unaware of the know-
ledge needs of scientists’ host countries.
These findings confirm what Vessuri and co-authors suggest hap-
pens throughout Latin America: scientists seeking publication in
‘core’ international journals are forced to participate in research
agendas defined by distant researchers, editors, and journals, often
to the exclusion of local and regional knowledge needs and interests
(Vessuri et al., 2014). In the case of Mexico, the desire to publish in
those core journals derives not just from scientists’ desire for pres-
tige, but it is codified in policies that frustrate many of the scientists
with whom I spoke.
4. Concluding thoughts: science and solving
problems
Science policies are products of political processes rooted in cultural
notions of ‘good’ science. In the USA, many of the main science pol-
icy documents of the postwar period have extolled a model of scien-
tific self-governance as yielding the most efficient advancement of
science, and essentially assumed that scientific productivity in the
form of publications and citations automatically yields societal
benefit. This thinking now permeates science in Latin America as
well (Vessuri et al., 2014). There are numerous problems with this
model, including the well-documented one that it does not encour-
age effective uptake and use of the resulting knowledge by potential
users. Equally problematic, though, is that science policies that focus
on increasing productivity neglect the fact that not all science is cre-
ated equal. In ecological research, where there are innumerable sci-
entific questions that could be asked of a huge range of ecosystems
and species, not all research agendas, approaches, or formats serve
societal (or scientific) goals equally well. Even the policies designed
only to boost productivity with no intent to steer science end up
incentivizing some types of and approaches to research to the detri-
ment of others. Vessuri et al. (2014) argue that when scientists seek
to publish in top international journals, an outcome codified in
Mexican science policy, the journals themselves:
Collectively, through their editorial policies, decide what ques-
tions are important, and thus create a kind of collective, flexible,
largely unplanned, yet narrowly controlled, form of science pol-
icy for the world. It is this collective device that, incidentally,
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largely accounts for curious knowledge gaps such as neglected
diseases. (Vessuri et al., 2014)
In the case of Mexico, science policies under SNI encourage exactly
that: they hand science policy decision-making authority to distant
editorial boards, and in the process direct research attention away
from known national knowledge needs.
It is understandable that sponsors of science in Mexico and else-
where want to ensure that they are benefiting from the resources
they pour into that work, but that which is most easily quantifiable
about science—publications, citations, and patents—is not inher-
ently related to the societal benefit that the society expects to receive
(Bozeman, 2003; Bozeman and Sarewitz, 2011; Meyer, 2011).
Building science policies around these quantifiable indicators dir-
ectly attaches Mexican research attention to the selective pressures
associated with international publication dynamics. This builds a
strong rudder into the systems steering science, but that rudder ac-
tively dissuades ecologists from addressing known knowledge needs.
This article documents that Mexico’s SNI discourages ecological re-
search that is risky, slower, or ‘merely’ of national or regional interest,
and it pushes scientists to publish in a foreign language in inaccessible
journals. And although many of the Mexican scientists we spoke with
desire to establish the ongoing two-way dialogue with knowledge users
that current scholarship suggests will yield more effective use and up-
take of scientific information, SNI systematically penalizes that ap-
proach to science. Even the scientists with whom we spoke who have a
more linear understanding of the relationship between knowledge cre-
ation and utilization have experienced unintended steering effects of
SNI and report that it undermines the quality of Mexican ecology.
The SNI system had its genesis in crisis, and it served an import-
ant purpose at a critical point in Mexican history. Its current imple-
mentation, though, is problematic. It does not have to be this way:
Latin America is leading global efforts to create alternative scientific
databases and encourage open access publishing (Vessuri et al.,
2014). Latindex, Redalyc, and SciELO are databases designed to
provide more comprehensive coverage of the Latin Amercan region.
As noted in the Section 2.3, Latindex lists 5,408 active periodicals in
Latin America ‘of academic interest’, as compared to 242 included
in the 2010 SCI (Alperin, 2014). Publication reward systems built
upon publication in Latindex journals would thus likely constitute a
substantial improvement to the problems documented in this article
and would better represent the work currently being done. WoS-
based evaluation is really a metric of the extent to which researchers
are contributing to the research interests of the world’s wealthy
countries, as filtered by profit-oriented editorial decisions by corpor-
ate owners of that database (c.f. Vessuri et al., 2014).
Within Mexico, reorienting publication incentives could happen
at a number of scales: SNI area committees could rework their point
allocation structures to reward publication in regional journals, and
universities and research institutions could do the same. Were regional
journals, indices and associated open access publication efforts to be
accepted, the uptake and use of scientists’ products would not be hin-
dered by financial barriers. And to the extent that these journals con-
tinue to accept Spanish language submissions, linguistic barriers to
knowledge uptake and use could be minimized. And importantly,
Mexico could retain control of its own research agenda and science
policy. The talented scientists of Mexico could be contributing articles
to educate the next generation of scientists in the region and decision-
makers would have better access to their work.
Recognizing that a citation in a scientific article is only one of
many potential indicators that a particular article has had an
‘impact’, a number of prominent efforts have emerged—and gained
vocal support in Latin America—to develop alternative metrics of
research importance (altmetrics; see Alperin et al., 2014). As authors
of a recent report on these efforts note, however, a major limitation
remains: the main altmetrics being developed still treat articles as
the unit of evaluation and thus exclude a substantial portion of re-
search in Latin America, which is communicated in forms other
than peer-reviewed publications (Alperin, 2014). A number of my
interview participants noted that government ministries and deci-
sion-makers frequently have no use for peer-reviewed publications;
what they need most from any given project may be reports, evalu-
ations, and community presentations. If these are the products most
desired by potential users of the research, they should be captured in
evaluations of researcher contributions.
Researcher evaluations constitute one of the more influential
forms of science policy in that they have systematic steering influ-
ences, shaping both the subjects and methods of research. The grow-
ing efforts to develop alternative metrics of scientific impact or
contribution (altmetrics) are improvement over citation-based met-
rics, especially those that are built around databases and indices
with strong biases against relevant languages. I would like to push
further: to ensure flexibility that would allow scientists to explore
the more biodiverse regions of the country, to work collaboratively
with the communities who stand to benefit from scientific know-
ledge, and to produce the knowledge that government decision-
makers actually need, policies must not strictly be oriented around
the quantification of publication outputs.
A number of authors have argued that in our complex world,
successfully addressing problems that simultaneously contain tech-
nical and value-based components—such as management of natural
resources—will require a new approach to research conduct and
evaluation (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Nowotny, 2003;
Nowotny et al., 2006; SPARC, 2010). Robertson and Hull (2003),
for example, advocate for an approach to ecology that directly en-
gages with stakeholders in a collaborative fashion in the service,
making the most of democratic and scientific processes. This
engaged approach of collaborating in long-term iterative relation-
ships with potential knowledge users is well accepted by many of
the Mexican ecologists with whom I spoke. It is not, however, com-
patible with the publication expectations within which they work:
time spent working with communities on the questions of interest to
them is time not dedicated to advancing research on topics of inter-
est to editors of journals, especially prestigious international ones.
Publication expectations rooted in an outmoded understanding of
the science–society relationship serve as powerful structural barriers
to attempts to better link scientific advancement with societal bene-
fit. Thoughtful researcher evaluation itself requires time and nuance.
As Philip Altbach has said, ‘It is probably too much to ask that care,
discretion and sophistication be used when making judgements that
often affect the salaries and academic futures of professors in an age
of hyperaccountability’ (Altbach, 2014), but that is exactly what is
needed if nations are to benefit from the research that they sponsor.
The tendency within science to reduce the impact of science to that
which is easily quantifiable and optimized—namely, publication and
citation in internationally recognized journals—is strong (Vessuri et al.,
2014). Tellingly, despite the presence of innovative regional databases
and indices and the strong dissatisfaction with ISI products, few of my
participants were familiar with these alternative databases when asked.
This is likely in part because they are not prominently featured in
the SNI and institution-specific policies that directly affect their pay,
and it speaks to the extent to which the ISI IFs have come to define
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high-quality scientific work for scientists worldwide. At the same time,
however, my interviews also reveal that Mexican ecologists have not
yet fully accepted the intensive quantification of productivity as inher-
ent to high-quality science. Since the area committees within SNI have
authority to alter their criteria for researcher evaluation those scientists
retain substantial power to improve the situation. Scientists themselves,
as arbiters of prestige within science, are accurately considered to be
science policy makers (Neff, 2011; Miller and Neff, 2013). There is
currently a window of opportunity for scientists and other science pol-
icy makers to reconsider how scientists are evaluated; that window
may close as scientists receiving their training today are acculturated
into a production-oriented scientific culture.
Acknowledgements
This research would not have been possible without the generosity of the
thirty people who gave an hour or more of their time to answer my questions.
I would also like to thank Sharon Zavala, Ziania Narvaez-Garcia, Samara
Almonte, and Alyssa Rooks for their work as research assistants. Thanks also
to three reviewers and the journal editors for their thoughtful and extensive
comments on a prior draft. This work was supported by the United States
National Science Foundation (www.nsf.gov) [Grant Nos. 1465279 and
1158723]. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations ex-
pressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the National Science Foundation.
References
Adler, R., Ewing, J., and Taylor, P. (2009) ‘Citation Statistics’, Statistical
Science, 24/1: 1.
Aitkenhead, D. (2013) ‘Peter Higgs: I Wouldn’t Be Productive Enough for
Today’s Academic System’. The Guardian, 6 Dec. 2013.
Alberts, B. (2013) ‘Impact Factor Distortions’, Science, 340/6134: 787.
Alperin, J. P (2014). ‘Open Access Indicators: Assessing the Growth and Use of
Open Access Resources from developing Regions- The case of Latin America’,
in J. P. Alperin, DS. d. Babini, and G. Fischman (eds) Open access indicators
and scholarly communications in Latin America. Argentina: Consejo
Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
Altbach, P. G. (2014) ‘What Counts for Academic Productivity in Research
Universities?’ University World News, 18 July 2014.
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Superior en México/ Foro Consultivo Cientı́fico y Tecnológico/
International Network for the Availability of Scientific Publications:
Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México.
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